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Chapter One
Inflating the Terror Threat Since 2001
When tragic events occur, people turn to their government leaders for
reassurance, information and direction. After the initial information-gathering phase,
people in the public will want to know how leadership will prevent similar tragedies
from occurring in future. Identifying what went wrong and who or what is at fault is
critical to preventing future crises. This identification period allows for interpretation.
How leaders communicate colors how the public will view events. What information
trickles out to the public dictates how the tragedy is viewed.
Assigning blame and crafting appropriate responses gets particularly cloudy
when a tragedy is driven by terrorists for a number of reasons. First, definitional issues
obfuscate who is a terrorist or what terrorism is. While politically motivated violence is
an accepted definition of terrorism, governments may simply label groups they don’t
like as terrorists 1.
Second, information asymmetries between the government and the public
obscure the true nature of the terrorist threat. As Marc Sageman notes, terrorism
scholars rarely gather first-hand data or even engage in interviews with relevant
parties. Instead, governments and intelligence agencies hold these bits of information to
themselves and many times withhold access to the accused as well as to important
documents2. Knowing how real a threat is when confidential information is used to
determine the threat level is akin to projecting the weather from a windowless
basement. Further there is a level of subjectivity to threat evaluation; the scary looking
creature in the shadows could be a bear or a pile of sheets—on some level we don’t
know until we turn on the lights. To this end, scholars can, many times in retrospect,
determine whether a terrorist threat is being oversold to the public, but terrorism
scholars do not have the certainty of chemists in their findings. Hindsight also is no
great recourse in a scientific endeavor; it would be nice to have more foreknowledge of
mischaracterized threats.
Finally, a high-casualty or high-publicity terrorist incident doesn’t yield much
clarity about how to prevent future attacks. Are there similar operatives out there? Are
they in position to conduct attacks? What policies or practices might stop them from
achieving their violent ends—if, indeed, they are determined to conduct violence?
Hypotheticals fill the answers to these questions. The American government may view
an actor as a ticking time bomb when in fact the individual is just going through
growing pains 3.
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The words of our leaders are critical in this sphere due to the wide latitude
governments have in defining and interpreting the threat of terrorism. Leaders can play
down or ratchet up threats4. These words are not just one scrap of a ball of information
that media-consumers ingest. Presidential rhetoric on terrorism serves to frame how the
issue is viewed, how fearful people are of the terrorist threat, and how the government
is bound to react to it. Public opinion, as will be seen, is one piece of the puzzle, but one
that crafty presidents can push in their favor. As Anthony DiMaggio shows, modern
presidents have typically determined policy with regard to the terrorist threat. One way
they have done this is by successfully convincing legislators and the government to
pursue their desired actions5.
This book asks two sets of questions about this process of how presidential
rhetoric defines the terror threat. The first set is:
• Why do Presidents talk the way they do about terrorism? What themes do
they use? What factors determine the frequency and content of their
pronouncements about terrorism?
In order to answer the first set of questions, a database of presidential speeches made by
Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump since the 9/11 attacks
will be examined and compared. It will be shown that presidents use their rhetoric to
set the political agenda and to sell policies. These questions will be dealt with
theoretically here in the first chapter and in more fine-grained detail in the three
empirical chapters on each individual President.
The second set of questions will be dealt with at the conclusion, but will
also be touched on throughout the book, these are:
• How should Presidents calibrate the threat? Do they overinflate it? Are
there risks to downplaying it? Are there any policy proposals that can be
derived from the comparison of post-9/11 presidential rhetoric?
Obviously, answering these questions is more an exercise in analysis and projection.
The policy proposals on how best to calibrate the terrorist threat will be based on
appropriate comparisons from the empirical chapters.
Presidential rhetoric is critically important in guiding American foreign and
domestic policy as well as in determining which threats are pursued by the American
government6. After the September 11 attacks, terrorism was touted as a threat that
would “never again” be ignored. Previous to the attacks, the terror threat flitted into
and out of American public consciousness, gaining attention when attacks occurred and
then fading away 7.
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This study examines how the terror threat is constructed and sold to the public
by American presidents. Other studies have examined how public opinion is moved by
the terror threat8. Here presidential rhetoric will be examined as an independent variable
that leads to the main dependent variable of foreign and domestic policy regarding
terrorism. Public opinion, as will be seen below, is a factor in the passage of foreign
policy but it is not a critical piece. If the public truly hates a president’s policies, they
can surely vote him or her9 out of office, but the public has a smaller role in the
legislative process than most people believe.
While the Bush administration employed rhetoric to foment wars in the Middle
East and South Asia, the Obama administration’s reticence on the issue and the Trump
administration’s linking of the issue to immigration and Islam-as-a-religion provide for
some significant side-effects that will be explored in the chapters on those presidents.
Barack Obama’s light speech-making on the terror threat, while still conducting a rather
robust war on terror including unprecedented drone strikes, shows that presidential
rhetoric to defend policies is not necessary when policies have already been passed by
Congress. Obama’s dismissal of the terror threat from ISIS, however, shows that there is
more reality to the terror threat and that it cannot be rhetorically downplayed into
extinction. For Donald Trump, the terror threat is about his “Muslim immigration ban”
and about vilifying immigrants. These intolerant statements have led to a spike in
Islamophobia and hate crimes that will be examined in the chapter on Trump.
Why Study Rhetoric?
The terror threat could certainly be studied from a multitude of different angles.
Threat assessments based upon military capabilities of non-state actors, public opinion
studies conducted on how fearful the public is of terrorism, and connect-the-dot
approaches gleaned from incidences of terrorism can all provide some insight into a
threat that Americans have, since 9/11, consistently seen as one of—if not the—most
important threats they faced10. This is surely partly due to the attacks of September 11,
2001, which sent the United States on a war footing against terrorist enemies. But it is
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also due to presidential rhetoric. Presidents can emphasize or downplay the terror
threat—and they can also link it to various other foreign or domestic issues.
The objective importance of events is not as patently obvious as one might
believe. As opinion leaders, presidents supply meaning to events by interpreting
them 11. This crucial interpretive role serves to align governing coalitions 12. How do they
provide meaning? Through language and communication. Adam Hodges emphasizes
that “only through language” do events get constructed into a narrative 13. Hodges notes
that the discourse, the “way of representing the knowledge about…a particular topic at
a particular historical moment,” 14 of the war on terror “govern[ed] public discussion
and debate on the topic”15. Presidents have the power to concoct myths or narratives
that suffuse public understanding of a topic. Ivie emphasizes that leaders can
manufacture truths simply by “speaking of them as true”16. Drawing on Murray
Edelman’s seminal work, Anthony DiMaggio states that, “Public policy is not about
objectively recognized problems, but rather about interpretations of alleged problems—
which are presented as ‘fact’—and driven by political ideologies” 17.
As Jeffrey Tulis laments, our constitutional government, which was meant to
facilitate deliberation and debate, is now driven by rhetoric aimed at inflaming
passions 18. The many politically inflammatory stories passed around Facebook on a
daily basis are a good example of this fact. The central figure in this rhetorical storm is
the President of the United States, who Craig and Kathy Smith note, “has the symbolic
function of representing all of America” 19. To wit, John Mueller finds that the President
(or a President) is frequently mentioned when Americans were asked by Gallup for the
name of a man they admire 20.
Politics is about mobilizing the public and legislators, and rhetoric serves that
purpose. Smith and Smith argue that “mobilizing is persuasion” 21. Governments can
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mobilize people through coercion or through a policy of seeking voluntary compliance.
Either way, rhetoric is used to explain, defend and define policies. Voluntary
compliance can be cajoled through a number of rhetorical arguments including pressing
the public to employ self-improvement measures that help the public good, appealing
to the public’s humanitarian urges, or claiming that inaction will lead to some sort of
danger or cataclysm 22.
Presidents struggle with whether they should act as the head of the government
or the leader of the people23. As Tulis writes, “Since the presidencies of Theodore
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, popular or mass rhetoric has become a principal tool
of presidential governance”24. What Tulis calls the rhetorical presidency represents a
“fundamental transformation” of the institution of the presidency25.
The new role of the President, as a leader of mass opinion, who actively and
frequently speaks to the public via the media contradicts the Founder’s vision and the
Constitution 26. Indeed, “For most federalists, ‘demagogue’ and ‘popular leader’ were
synonyms, and nearly all references to popular leaders in their writings are pejorative 27.
They worried that a “leader of the people” (the original Greek meaning of
“demagogue”) would be particularly adept at swaying the passions of the masses and
thus could not only become a tyrant but could also subvert the carefully built
institutional structures they created28. In the spirit of political scientists, the Founders
believed that the right institutional structures would produce sound policy29. The
Founders did not have great faith in direct democracy, instead they sought to create a
system where the people (really, a portion of the people given the limited suffrage of
the time) indirectly selected leaders. According to Tulis, “They worried that the
dynamics of mass politics would at best produce poorly qualified presidents and at
worst open the door to demagoguery and regime instability” 30. They also created the
Electoral College to attenuate the power of the people and fashioned term-lengths that
would allow the President and Senators space and time to make decisions without
worrying too much about oncoming elections. They also saw the Constitution, in
conjunction with the people, as the locus of “authority and formal power”31.
The presidency was meant to be independent as, in Thomas Jefferson’s words, he
or she would be “the only national officer ‘who commanded a view of the whole
ground’” 32. Each branch of government was meant to control its own sphere of
influence, though those spheres of influence overlapped 33. The first presidents made
22
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written communiques (sometimes spoken) to Congress and, when they spoke directly
to the people such as during an inaugural address, made sure to defer to constitutional
principles 34. Still, George Washington, the first President, “established the practice of
‘going on tour’” to speak to the citizenry. Though, at that stage, speech-making was less
important than simply making a public appearance 35.
Woodrow Wilson ushered in a new way of viewing the presidency as he saw his
role as one of interpreting the people’s desires 36. While people’s feelings and opinions
are fleeting and many times convoluted, a leader can bring clarity through this style of
interpretation. Tulis writes that this involves two skills: “First, the leader must
understand the true majority sentiment underneath the contradictory positions of
factions and the discordant views of the mass. Second, the leader must explain the
people’s true desires to them in a way that is easily comprehended and convincing” 37.
In the twentieth century, presidential speeches became inspirational or policy-oriented
and moved from mostly written communication to oratory38. The rhetorical presidency
“substituted passionate appeal and argument by metaphor for deliberation” 39.
Tulis emphasizes that there are limits to the powers of even the most skilled
president 40. After all, “rhetorical strategies do not always work as expected, nor are they
cost-free as the conventional wisdom implies” 41. Further, the rhetorical presidency has
brought with it “systemic costs, among them an increasing lack of ‘fit’ between
institution and occupant, a greater mutability of policy, an erosion of the processes of
deliberation, and a decay of political discourse” 42. Presidents today are expected to
possess exceptional oratorical skills as well as the abilities to negotiate with Congress43.
“Changes in the presidential selection system,” particularly the advent of the partisan
primary system, in addition to “the institutionalization of the White House
speechwriting staff, and the development of the mass media all contribute to the
blessings and burdens of rhetorical governance”44.
Today, presidents have little time for leadership with campaigns starting sooner
and sooner—and as will be seen in Trump’s case, presumably never ending. “The
overlap of the electoral campaign with the process of governing,” Tulis writes, “means
that the distinction between campaigning and governing is being effaced” 45. Whereas in
the past campaigning was beneath leaders, today leaders make popular appeals as they
constantly hone their campaigning skills 46.
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Smith and Smith’s discussion of the jeremiad provides insight into the content
and import of modern presidential rhetoric. As they define it, “The jeremiad is a
rhetorical form that frames troublesome social problems in the logic of God’s covenant
with a chosen people” 47. They note that jeremiads have their positive aspects: they can
“enhance social cohesion,” “provide a sense of order and security,” “justify change in
society,” and “elevate the president relative to other political actors” 48. Jeremiads are an
increasingly important facet of what Smith and Smith call “the sermonic presidency” 49.
Jeremiads serve to rally the people, framing them as a chosen people that needs
to mobilize for a political purpose 50. To this end, jeremiads can be dangerous. They
elevate the executive beyond the role envisioned in the Constitution, they stifle dissent,
and they “loosen constitutional checks on the president by reconstituting legal-political
issues as tests of faith” 51. Bush’s jeremiads about good versus evil after 9/11 transmuted
into Obama’s jeremiads about change and a hopeful future.
To sum up, the President is the central figure in American politics. During crises,
the public looks to their leader for guidance, interpretation and direction. Where
terrorism is concerned, information assymetries also lead the public to play follow-theleader due to their lack of knowledge on the level of threat 52. Rhetoric, as will be further
established, is the main method presidents use to mobilize the public and legislators.
How this is done will be elaborated in the following sections.
Policy Selling and Agenda-Setting: The Power of Presidential Rhetoric
As the previous section exhibited, presidential rhetoric is a critically important
component of governance in the American system. Presidential speeches can inspire or
provoke the public, they can explain policy proposals, they can move opinion, and they
can also set the government’s agenda. This section will delve into this latter category:
agenda-setting, and show how important presidential rhetoric is to setting the
government agenda particularly with regard to terrorism and foreign policy.
The President has eminent importance in the policy making process. As one
lobbyist recounted, “Obviously, when a president sends up a bill, it takes first place in
the queue. All other bills take second place” 53. Jon Kingdon writes that the process of
making public policy involves (1) agenda setting, (2) delineating what alternatives to
choose from, (3) making a selection from among available alternatives, and (4)
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implementation of a decision 54. As Kingdon emphasizes, a President can bring great
salience to a topic or an idea. President Carter made hospital cost containment a major
theme of his presidency, and the term went from being mentioned in 18 percent of
health interviews in 1976 to 81 percent in 1977. A similar presidentially-enacted
turnaround happened with trucking deregulation (going from being mentioned in 16
percent of transportation interviews in 1977 to 83 percent in 1978). Kingdon makes sure
to reiterate that, “The president, of course, does not totally control the policy agenda.”
Indeed, “Setting the agenda and getting one’s way… are two very different things” 55.
The President sets the agenda for three reasons. Firstly, are his or her
institutional resources: the power to hire and fire appointees as well as the power to
veto legislation. Second come the President’s organizational resources—as a unitary
decision-maker the President has more individual sway than do the 535 members of
Congress. Third, the President has “a command of public attention, which can be
converted into pressure on governmental officials to adopt the president’s agenda” 56.
Agenda-setting, Jeffrey Cohen explains, is the “initial stage of the policy-making
process.” During this stage, “problems are identified, converted into issues, and issues
are prioritized.” There are two major constraints on this process: the short attention
span of politicians and the public as well as budgetary and other resource constraints 57.
Cohen hypothesized that public concern with a policy area rises with presidential
emphasis on that same area, though presidential concern is not the sole factor in raising
public concern 58. Cohen’s analysis finds that “not only does the president seem able to
affect what problems people think are important, but he also seems to be able to affect
what policy solutions they prefer” 59. In order for the President to lead the public, he or
she must employ rhetoric to affect people’s policy positions and concerns60. In order to
keep an issue on the public’s minds, a President needs to repeat his or her concerns
often 61.
The power of the presidency to set the agenda is exhibited in this excerpt from
Kingdon on the Reagan administration:
“The new Reagan administration, for instance, structured the governmental policy
agenda to include items on which it placed a high priority, but in the process made
it virtually impossible to get other potential initiatives seriously considered. Thus
people in and around government worked on such subjects as cuts in domestic
spending and school prayer, but did not devote serious attention to such subjects as
comprehensive national health insurance. Among the easily recognizable products
of a new administration or a shift in ideological or partisan balance in Congress is
54
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the rise to agenda prominence of some agenda items. Less recognizable but fully as
important is the fact that other items do not rise, as a new administration makes their
consideration impossible” 62.
Kingdon emphasizes that the road to policy formation is rife with “messiness, accident,
fortuitous coupling, and dumb luck” 63. Presidents can set agendas, but there is a
healthy dose of randomness involved in what policies get passed and even what rises to
the top of the government’s agenda 64. The media, interest groups, external events,
negotiations with and within Congress, political appointees, and academics and policy
experts all play a role in the process. As Kingdon finds, “The processes by which public
policies are formed are exceedingly complex. Agenda-setting, the development of
alternatives, and choices among those alternatives seem to be governed by different
forces. Each of them is complicated by itself, and the relations among them add more
complications. These processes are dynamic, fluid, and loosely joined” 65.
Terrorism fits the description of a topic that can be capitalized upon when a
policy window opens. Policy windows open due to political occurrences (such as a midterm election changing the composition of Congress) or due to the rise of new,
compelling problems 66. Terrorism fits this second condition. It opens a window for
presidents to forward their preferred policies.
If presidents set agendas, then what is the role of the public? Doesn’t public
opinion play an important role? One might believe so, but public opinion’s role is
limited in the legislative process and, as will be seen, it can be conformed to the desires
of the President. Richard Sobel finds that “public opinion constrains, but does not set,
American foreign intervention policy” 67. Sobel notes that foreign policy is determined
by a narrow group consisting of three main officers, as mandated by the Constitution
these are: the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State68. As Page
and Shapiro find, repeated presidential pronouncements can move public opinion 5 to
10 percentage points over a few months 69. Moreover, a factor in the President’s favor is
that a large portion of the public does not even know what it thinks about issues, citing
that they “Don’t Know” when asked what they think 70. Leadership could view this
group as one that can be easily swayed or ignored.
So what is the role of speech-making? After all, if the public acts, at best, as a
constraint on policy, then why does the President need to try to convince them of
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anything? Firstly, presidential rhetoric is meant to persuade both the public and
legislators. Secondly, having public support for a policy certainly does not hurt its
chances of being passed. In Cohen’s words, leadership is important, but public support
is necessary for it can be “converted into political influence.” To this end, the leader
must “connect with the public, convincing it that he stands for them, that he has their
best interests in mind” 71. Both of these points will be elaborated upon further in this
chapter.
For now, it’s important to note that, “speaking and governing have merged”
since “presidents use speech to mobilize the public behind their policy efforts” 72.
Presidents also “have considerable latitude in how they define the relevant constituency
for each policy problem that arises” because they represent the nation as a whole, a
country made up of a great multitude of publics 73. This power amounts to the power to
set the agenda and frame events on one’s own terms74. As DiMaggio finds, politicians
don’t seek to conform to public whims. Instead, “Presidents retain their own political
agendas, which they attempt to ‘sell’ to the public” 75. Presidents’ agenda-setting role
includes the “power to construct narratives,” which a media that is dependent on
political statements for information often parrots76. The public needs a leader to
interpret and encapsulate their disparate opinions; in the United States, the President
serves this role.
An important case study on how U.S. Presidents can set agendas to sell wars
comes from John Mueller’s book Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War. Mueller catalogues
how the first George Bush set America toward a course of war with Iraq through his
rhetoric. Mueller is careful to note that Bush did not achieve his goal by persuading the
public to support war. Instead, he sold the war by setting the agenda. In Mueller’s words,
“he managed to lead the country to war because, as President, he was able to keep the
issue brewing as an important one; because he could unilaterally commit the country to
a path that dramatically increased a sense of fatalism about war and perhaps convinced
many that there was no honorable alternative to war; because he could credibly promise
a short, beneficial, and relatively painless war; because he and his top aides enjoyed a
fair amount of trust in matters of foreign policy at the time; and because Saddam
Hussein played the role of a villain with such consummate skill” 77. While George H.W.
Bush successfully placed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on the political agenda, and
convinced the public of its importance, the wisdom of military action against Iraq was
not initially shared by everyday Americans 78. Indeed, the public was split on military
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action even after troops were deployed, protests broke out in at least fifteen U.S. cities
on October 20, 1990 and the public did not support the restoration of the Kuwaiti royal
family to power as a reason for going to war 79. Despite public apprehensions in
October, by January Congress had approved of military action80. This was due partly to
Bush’s characterization of Saddam Hussein as worse than Hitler 81, and partly to
Hussein’s own antics including threats to use chemical weapons and to attack Israel in
addition to appearing on television with hostages82. Public opinion served as a
guardrail for Bush, but one he successfully manipulated 83. To this end, Mueller finds
that presidential rhetoric, where no great credibility gap exists, can effectively set the
foreign policy agenda. Mueller bolsters his findings with evidence from World War II
showing that Franklin D. Roosevelt successfully moved the country toward war 84.
Presidents, then, can set agendas and try to sell policies through concerted
rhetoric, but the results of their work always lie in question. Presidents act like
television or streaming networks whose platform gives them great power through their
viewership. These networks set the agenda by providing a suite of programs viewers
can watch, but not all programs are successful. The whims of viewers, competition from
other channels, the weather outside, and other factors play a part. Networks try to
project what viewers will watch, but they also forward programming that they think
might be important for artistic, political or other reasons. The fact that not all programs
succeed, doesn’t mean that Netflix or NBC aren’t powerful, just that they can’t dictate
exactly what a person chooses to watch—though they can delineate the alternatives.
To wit, Smith and Smith find that “Presidential leadership in the modern era
entails persuasion” 85. Effective persuasion entails speaking at the right moment and
choosing messages carefully. Timing is, of course, critical in presidential persuasion. As
is well known among human relationships, timing is critical when trying to convey an
argument meant to convince someone else 86. Presidential rhetoric also exists in a world
where various rhetors compete for attention and compete to define the political agenda.
To this end, while the President may be the most visible figure in this marketplace of
ideas, he or she must vie with numerous competing streams for attention including
those from other politicians and the media 87. Smith and Smith also note that successful
presidents must change their rhetoric as circumstances shift 88. Those who stick to the
same story for too long could fall into credibility gaps (more on these later) or simply
lose their audience.
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Smith and Smith see presidential persuasion as critical to the functioning of
American democracy. The authors believe that for the federal government to work in
governing a large and heterogeneous society the White House must speak89. For this
reasons, Smith and Smith hold not only that understanding presidential rhetoric is
critical to understanding the workings and motivations of the American government,
but that presidential rhetoric itself is critical to the implementation of policies through
agenda-setting, prioritization, persuasion, and policy-selling.
Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha gives agenda-setting an interesting twist: noting that
leaders set the agenda for legislators as well as attempting to do so for the public.
Presidential rhetoric is a powerful tool. As presidents increasingly rely on “crisis
politics” to generate interest, they may face an erosion in their credibility as citizens
start to question the legitimacy of rhetorically-constructed crises 90. The permanent
campaign is a symptom of the unending pursuit of public approval 91. As EshbaughSoha writes, citing Kingdon, “Presidents are adept agenda setters because they are the
focal point of US politics” 92. He goes on to state that, “presidents can and do influence
the adoption and implementation of policy through direct signaling even though this
source of influence varies by policy area and across institutions.” He further posits that,
“legislators and bureaucrats should respond to presidential signals because they have a
need for cognitive efficiency, and the president’s role in the policy process gives them
reason to respond to his signals” 93.
Even George Edwards, who is skeptical of the importance of presidential
rhetoric, contends that, “presidents are facilitators who reflect, and may intensify,
widely held views.” He goes on to acknowledge that chief executives “may endow the
views of their supporters with structure and purpose” 94. Edwards asserts that
presidents have broad authority to craft their political messages as they see fit 95. To this
end, the President serves an important agenda setting function. Edwards tries to
downplay this fact by emphasizing that the mass media is clogged with competing
messages and information flows and that the mass public is not particularly interested
in politics 96. Further, events can and do interrupt the sustained persuasion of any chief
executives, as Edwards traces with Bill Clinton’s difficulty in passing healthcare
legislation 97. Edwards, who we will return to later this chapter, finds that, “the
president often provides competition for himself as he addresses other issues” 98.
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Presidents set the agenda by framing issues. As Edwards writes, “Through
framing, the president attempts to define what a public policy issue is about.” He defines
a frame as “as central organizing idea for making sense of an issue or conflict and
suggests what the controversy is about and what is at stake” 99. Presidents also set the
agenda by framing debates internally, within their own administrations, as, for instance,
Barack Obama did when he discussed how extensive the overall mission should be in the
Afghanistan war 100. Feaver and Gelpi highlight how presidents can frame an outcome to
try to bend the public and government toward support for the President’s preferred
policies. The authors write, for instance, that a commander-in-chief could seek to
“galvanize the public and to demonize the enemy” after a high-casualty event rather than
admitting defeat. Such a rhetorical strategy would be an attempt to benefit from the rally
round the flag effect, an effect which posits that the public will rally behind their leaders
during crises 101.
War rhetoric is a particularly powerful form of persuasion for leaders seeking to
move public beliefs 102. In Leaders at War, Elizabeth Saunders finds that despite the
complexity and bureaucracy endemic in the American democratic system, presidents
play a critical role in electing to intervene in other countries militarily. The threat
perceptions of the President also determine the extent of the military intervention 103.
Policy Selling
Policy selling is a slightly different story. Here policies are discussed as being
“sold” because the President works to enact laws or policies against the context of an
often skeptical and increasingly divided public and Congress. Persuasion is certainly a
key element of selling and that term is appropriate at certain points of the process, but
selling better captures the reality that once a policy is enacted, the public and government
have (often quite literally) “bought” the President’s proposals. Further, once a policy
becomes a reality, it is difficult to unwind—as will be seen throughout this book with
regard to the counterterrorism agenda.
Policies and the spending that supports them have to be sold to voters, particularly
when the policies begin. The justification need not match the motivation. Whether our
policies aim to promote liberty, serve bureaucratic interests, or occur out of inertia,
policymakers can justify them with arguments about security. Ideological arguments are
made too, but danger is a better pitch. People see threats as more legitimate justifications
for policies than ideological ends. 104 As Winkler concludes, “portraying foreign leaders
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both as terrorists and as state sponsors of terrorism were the public communication
strategies” of both Reagan and Bush 43’s preemptive war efforts105.
Terrorism is another enemy presidents can use to sell overseas commitments and
domestic security policies. Of course, terrorism will be more useful in selling policies to
the extent they are legitimately linked to it—evoking the al Qaeda or ISIS threat will not
convince many people to support NASA exploration, presumably. Policies will need the
most selling when they are costly, especially if the costs concentrate opposing interest
groups 106. They will also tend to need public defense when they are new and require a
legislative and bureaucratic departure from the status quo.
Carol Winkler finds that both Presidents George W. Bush and Ronald Reagan
reacted similarly in response to the threat of terror. Both focused on preemptive war,
both sought to tie terrorism to state sponsors, and both sought retaliation against
enemies they framed as aggressors 107. Both also covertly tried to destabilize their
opponent’s regimes and, in turn, sought to provoke them into an act of aggression
while also hiding behind contentions that they gave non-military measures a chance
before moving to the use of force108. Reagan and George W. Bush “further blurred the
line between offense and defense by adjusting their narrative timelines. Both
administrations maintained that their uses of force were continuations of ongoing wars
that had existed for years, not the initiation of new conflicts” 109. American Presidents
also consistently omit the goals of terrorists or mischaracterize them as being against
“freedom, democracy or liberty” 110. This serves to dehumanize the terrorist Other 111.
The many-times narrow political objectives of terrorists get lost in this framing.
The agenda setting and policy selling components of presidential rhetoric work
together. Presidents choose what to speak about, selecting from a large array of
potential threats or policy goals: climate change, the economy, peace in the Middle East,
immigration, and so on could all be the subjects of focus. By choosing certain themes or
frames, the President sets the country’s agenda. President Bill Clinton famously did this
when he pivoted away from discussing terrorism after the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing so that he could continue his narrative of economic growth112. Setting the
agenda allows presidents to sell the policies that they want to pursue. Rhetoric involves
choice, the choice to select certain words, phrases, or themes in the pursuit of
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persuasion 113. Framing serves to simplify issues. As Edwards elaborates, “Instead of
trying to persuade the public directly on the merits of a proposal…, the White House
often uses public statements and the press coverage they generate to articulate relatively
simple themes” 114. It is these themes where they regard terrorism, be they simple or not,
that we tried to capture in this study.
As this section has shown, agenda-setting and policy selling are critical
components of governance and important characteristics of presidential rhetoric. If a
President wants to discuss a carbon tax, he or she might choose to focus on the
environment. If a President wants to sell a war with Syria, he or she might set the
agenda by discussing ISIS or the brutality of Middle Eastern dictatorships. Agendasetting helps sell policies and policy selling is the goal of agenda-setting. Together,
policy selling and agenda-setting serve to mobilize people, be they politicians or the
public, through persuasion 115. Feaver and Gelpi find that the US public is not opposed
to military casualties, they are opposed to military conflicts they think can’t be won 116.
In this light, Edwards admits that presidents may go public with their policy
arguments to consolidate “core supporters” or to influence “elite debate, journalistic
coverage, or congressional deliberation” 117. Consolidating core supporters helps sell
policies, influencing elites sets the country’s agenda. Each leader has the tools to choose
what items to focus more time and effort on. Certainly crises and surprises do occur—
an environmental catastrophe could divert the attention of a President seeking to focus
on something else—but by and large Presidents use rhetoric, bargaining and their bully
pulpit to set agendas and sell policies. This is what Neustadt means when he says that
presidents have the power to persuade 118. How Presidents talk, what themes they use,
and how they define crises, drive national security goals and inform policy debates.
National policies are, thusly, formed by rhetoric.
Presidential Power and Weakness: The Need for Rhetoric
Now that the power of presidential rhetoric to set agendas and set policies has
been established, some important constraints to presidents getting their way will be
examined in this section. We will begin with a discussion of presidential powers and
weaknesses, then move to a discussion of congressional partisanship, presidential
popularity, and the role of the media. This will lead into a more focused discussion
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countering the On Deaf Ears thesis that presidents are not nearly as powerful as many
believe.
Richard Neustadt’s seminal book on the modern presidency proposes that
presidential power amounts to “personal influence.” Since the President needs so many
others to consent to his or her desires, the theme of Neustadt’s book is “presidential
weakness” 119. Neustadt, who worked on President Harry S Truman’s staff, writes that,
“Everybody now expects the man inside the White House to do something about
everything” 120. Brody agrees, finding that the presidency has become increasingly
central to American politics as political elites and the public continually expand the
number of policy issues they expect the leader to manage 121. To this end, Neustadt asks
whether Presidents are leaders or clerks 122.
The need to bargain circumscribes presidential power 123. Neustadt underlines
the frustrations that President Dwight Eisenhower had when he became the country’s
leader after a career in the military. Eisenhower expressed his great frustration in the
need to convince and coordinate so many other people to get anything done 124. This is
due to the constitutional government in the United States where separate institutions
share power 125. This situation leads a President to lean on rhetoric to lead the people
and accomplish his or her goals. Neustadt notes that a President’s power is “persuasive
power” and that his or her “status” and “authority” add to this power of persuasion 126.
A President must also employ his or her reputation as politicians and bureaucrats need
to believe that the leader “has the skill and will enough to use his advantages” if they
are to take the President’s words seriously 127.
Presidents are not, however, prime ministers. Tulis writes that the modern
presidency has many powers including “the regular active initiation and supervision of
a legislative program; the use of the veto to propose legislation as a matter of partisan
policy rather than of constitutional propriety; the development and ‘institutionalization’
of a large White House staff; and the development and use of ‘unilateral’ powers, such
as executive agreements in place of treaties, or withholding of documents from
Congress under doctrines of ‘executive privilege’” 128. Presidents also command a
massive executive branch and act as the commander-in-chief of the most powerful
military in world history. Neustadt emphasizes the heavy burden of maintaining and
controlling the world’s second largest nuclear arsenal on the President of the United
States. The President’s power to potentially start a nuclear war that could “incinerate a
hemisphere” surely puts his or her power into context 129. So that while presidents may
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seem hemmed in by constitutional constraints, it is critical to keep in mind the vast
power held in this office.
Relatedly, William Howell and Jon Pevehouse aim to show the limits of
presidential war powers. While the President’s war powers have limits as, for instance,
the Supreme Court in July 2006 struck down Bush’s anti-terrorism military tribunals,
presidents have many options in enacting foreign policy 130. In this case, Bush went on to
mobilize Congress to pass the Military Commissions Act which maintained the antiterrorist CIA detention program he had initiated 131.
Congressional Partisanship
By design, the legislature represents an obstacle to presidential agenda-setting
leading directly to policy. The chief executive’s policy goals need to be filtered through
a bicameral legislature that is further divided by two increasingly recalcitrant main
political parties. For these reasons, presidential signals may have little effect on
Congress members132. Indeed, legislators may choose to simply ignore the President—
as they did with President Obama’s final Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland.
Going even further, Jon Kingdon argues that legislators rarely take their cues from
presidents133. Eshbaugh-Soha finds that while presidential signals can have an agendasetting effect, the current state of increased partisanship has “decreased the possibility
for bipartisanship and compromise” 134. That said, by repeatedly addressing a topic,
presidents do increase its salience. Eshbaugh-Soha finds this to be the most consistent
explanation for why presidents have influence over policy 135.
Congressionally-focused theorists surely have a point to some of their
arguments, but they gloss over the power of the executive by narrowing their
expectations of what a president’s words are meant to accomplish. That said, partisan
polarization is a very real impediment to presidential policy-making. Partisan
polarization occurs when governing elites themselves are polarized 136. As Adam
Berinsky’s elite cue theory holds, “members of the public will look to prominent
political actors as guides for their positions on… war” 137. Richard Brody’s findings
support Berinsky’s theory. Brody finds that the public is sensitive to governmental
opinion leaders. When opposition politicians support the President’s policies, or at least
are quiescent in their regard, public support for the leader increases. When the
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opposition criticizes the policies of the leadership, even in the face of an international
crisis, the opposite can occur138.
John Zaller’s work on polarization and public opinion is especially instructive
here. Citizen opinions are predicated upon the information provided by elites—
including politicians, specialists and journalists 139. People with more education are
more susceptible to elite cues as they are exposed to more elite discourse 140. This is a
fancy way of saying that since those with more education read more news, they are
more susceptible to aligning their beliefs with those of elites. But, of course, both the
public and elites have political predispositions and biases 141. Further, elites are not
unified in their messaging. Zaller notes that political messages have “cognitive and
affective elements.” For instance, a person seen lying on the sidewalk can be framed as
a “’bum’” or as “’a person like myself who has unfortunately lost his job.’” Political
messages also contain persuasive and cueing messages. Zaller defines persuasive
messages as “arguments or images providing a reason for taking a position or point of
view” 142. Cueing messages provide context that allows listeners to derive partisan
ramifications for accepting a certain point of view 143.
Given the power of elite cues, Zaller finds that popular presidents can have huge
effects on the opinions of their supporters and, to a lesser extent, the public as a whole.
He notes that a Nixon speech in 1971 on imposing wage and price controls swung an
additional 45 percent of Republican partisans and 10 percent of the public as a whole
toward the President’s position, according to Gallup, but had little effect on Democratic
partisans 144. This speaks to the polarization endemic in American society today.
Attuned conservatives seek out information consistent with their viewpoints and
attuned liberals do the same145. This does not mean that American public opinion is
always split, but rather that the public takes its cues from partisan sources. When these
sources deviate from one another, public opinion does the same 146. In some cases, Zaller
states, “elite cues functioned to activate ideological predispositions among the
politically aware.” Yet there are cases, such as contested elections, where “the entire
mass public…relies heavily on partisan cues” 147. Zaller concludes that elites dominate
the opinions of the public, basically defining these opinions. “Many citizens…,” Zaller
writes, “pay too little attention to public affairs to be able to respond critically to the
political communications they encounter; rather, they are blown about by whatever
current of information manages to develop the greatest intensity. The minority of
citizens who are highly attentive to public affairs are scarcely more critical: They
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respond to new issues mainly on the basis of the partisanship and ideology of the elite
sources of the messages” 148. Basically, Zaller sees two potential opinion landscapes. One
where elites are more-or-less unified in their views leading to a more united public and
one where elites are divided leading to a public divided “along lines that mirror the
elite ideological conflict” 149.
Howell and Pevehouse find that unfavorable partisan composition of Congress
can constrain presidential war efforts, but, as previously mentioned, presidents can also
sidestep Congress 150. Harry Truman, by declaring the Korean War “a police action,” set
a precedent for presidents to subvert Congress in their war efforts—efforts which now
did not require a formal declaration of war 151. The authors, whose argument is that
Congress can rein in presidents who seek military adventure, admit that checks and
balances exist in a “diminished” state 152. Presidents can circumvent Congress by
approving of smaller military missions 153—a critical point for the fight against
terrorism, which is full of these sorts of small, asymmetric strikes. For their part,
Congressional representatives may not oppose the President’s war efforts due to
worries about seeming anti-military 154. The authors conclude that, where war is
concerned, “the executive, by and large, determines the scope and nature of the
debate”155, once again emphasizing the executive’s agenda-setting role.
John Mueller finds that some of the public supports war because “they are
inclined to support their country and its leadership” 156. Public opinion is not easy to
sway particularly because many people are stuck in their positions. Feaver and Gelpi
note that 30-35 percent of the American public are “solid hawks,” supporting the
government’s war efforts in almost all cases, while 10-30 percent of the American public
are “solid doves,” opposing war in almost all cases 157. For partisan issues, the same is
true. A sizeable portion of the public is solidly committed to their party. This landscape
means that convincing the public through persuasion can only go so far, but mobilizing
the public—staunch supporters as well as independents—is truly critical to getting a
president’s agenda accomplished.
Relatedly, George Edwards, whose arguments we will return to shortly, argues
that presidents have little effect on public opinion due to hardened partisan positions, a
media landscape not conducive to the public receiving presidential messages, and a
public that is not that interested in politics to begin with. Yet, he rightfully notes that,
“Not all of the White House’s public relations efforts are designed to alter opinions” 158.
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Instead, the chief executive can frame or agenda-set by structuring the various,
amorphous opinions of the public. Mass opinion “requires leadership to tap into it
effectively, give it direction, and use it to bring about policy change” 159. That said, this
section has shown that partisan polarization, while less restrictive in the realm of
military strikes, acts as a constraint on presidential power—one that leaders will try to
break through with policy-selling and agenda-setting rhetoric.
Presidential Popularity
A rich scholarship on the subject has established the importance of presidential
popularity in passing policy. The main thrust of this scholarship is that more popular
presidents are more able to achieve their policy goals because they have the public
behind them. The research on presidential popularity will be explored in this section.
The President’s popularity, like the popularity of anyone, is based upon
expectations160. A president who achieves average outcomes may benefit from low
expectations in the realm of popularity while a president who the public thinks the
world of, Obama comes to mind, may suffer from unrealistic public hopes. Brody writes
that presidential popularity, meaning support from the public, “is said to be a political
resource that can help [the President] achieve his program, keep challengers at bay, and
guides his and other political leaders’ expectations about the president’s party’s
prospects in presidential and congressional elections” 161. Samuel Kernell shows that
President Reagan was more effective in pressuring Congress on his budget proposals
with a strategy of public rhetorical pressure when the President himself was more
popular 162.
Presidential popularity and war are deeply intertwined. In describing the rallyround-the-flag effect, John Mueller notes that the American public is apt to support
their government once a commitment to go to war has been decided upon. He surmises
that a public vote on war even before any government commitment would probably
“be heavily influenced by the position of the leadership” 163. Mueller finds that
exogenously-caused crises can lead people to rally around the President simply because
the President is in charge 164. Mueller notes that such a bump in popularity is, however,
short-lived 165.
Studies have repeatedly shown that popular presidents can move public
opinion 166, but unpopular leaders either don’t move opinion or actually repel public
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opinion away from their policy goals 167. Eshbaugh-Soha, citing scholarly literature,
holds that “presidents will be more successful in Congress during their first-year
honeymoons than during other years” 168. Anthony DiMaggio finds that U.S. presidents
are more successful in selling foreign policy goals earlier in their presidencies 169.
Public opinion, then, is not an exogenous factor completely independent of the
chief executive. Instead, it is something that leaders can mold and mobilize, particularly
when they are popular. As Jeffrey Cohen emphasizes, “Presidents do not seem to
construct policies with any systematic attention to the public in mind. When we
consider the ideological leanings of presidents on specific policy areas, little
responsiveness to the public is noted” 170. President Trump’s first-term tax cut is a case
in point. The public supported a tax cut, but many did not like the final bill which
capped state-and-local tax deductions. Cohen explains that as policies move toward
more detailed legislating phases, the effect of public opinion on the President drifts
away for two main reasons. First, the President needs to bargain with Congress. Second,
the public serves as “a poor guide” at this stage of the policy-making process due to its
lack of detailed knowledge on legislating or the relevant issues 171.
Presidential popularity is certainly important for a leader taking the temperature
of whether he will win a second term in office. Leaders know that disaffecting too large
a portion of the electorate could lead to their loss of power (either directly through a
president losing an election or indirectly through a president’s party losing seats in
Congress). They also know that political opposition and media criticism can erode a
president’s popularity 172. Consequently, public approval of their policies can serve as a
constraint on their behavior173.
Unlike congressional partisanship, though, presidential popularity, today a daily
news item, does not dictate whether policy will be passed or what that policy will
contain. A leader can look to popularity figures for some insights into how the public
sees his or her performance, but, given the current hyper-partisan landscape, leaders
can just as easily ignore these numbers. Further, the public is not involved in the
legislative process, so popularity may only be important in agenda-setting not in the
actual writing of policy.
The Role of the Media
Presidential rhetoric is almost always received by the public via the mass media.
Few members of the public have the opportunity to view presidential statements first167
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hand and only select members of the media witness multiple presidential statements
firsthand. As Brody writes, “Most of the world, if known at all, is known vicariously,
through the media of mass communication” 174. One could, then, argue that the media
plays a very large role in what messages reach the public. Media framing, the way
journalists present stories, is also critically important 175. The media chooses what stories
it wants to tell and how to portray presidential statements. It also can clip statements
down to sound bites that paint the President in a sympathetic or unfavorable light. As
this section will show, the President’s power to manipulate the media counteracts the
media’s power to distort the chief executive’s words.
Presidential communication has always had to swim through the media’s filter to
reach the public’s ears. For instance, Andrew Johnson had no trouble communicating
his messages via speeches that were reported on via newspapers and pamphlets 176.
These old forms have been replaced by Youtube and Twitter but before Facebook
became the town square actual town squares existed.
Today, the White House and the press occupy a relationship “in which each side
anticipates and responds to distant possibly exploitive actions of the other.” The White
House staff actively tries to shape the news and get out the “line for the day” 177.
Meanwhile, news agencies, seeking to maintain their independence, emphasize
presidential failures more than successes and edit presidential statements as they see
fit 178 (Enter: The “Sound Bite”). While Tulis notes the immediate national audience that
the mass media provides the President, he also observes that the media increasingly
gives the President less and less control over the communication process179. This may be
why Donald Trump has arrived at using social media for communicating with his
supporters.
Yet while politicians and the public decry a biased news media affecting how
each views the other, scholarship shows that the media has a more limited role in
framing presidential rhetoric. Jon Kingdon finds that mass media has a smaller effect on
the government agenda than most give it credit for as the media usually just reports
events180. Relatedly, interest groups and academics affect the alternatives that are
considered but don’t set the agenda181. John Mueller agrees with Kingdon. He notes
that the media does not have an independent impact on events, rather mediating
(literally, playing a middle role) communication between the government and the
public 182. To the extent that the media is a business predicated upon viewership, the
public sets the media’s agenda rather than vice versa 183.
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Contrary to popular belief, Anthony DiMaggio finds that journalists simply
parrot official narratives as their professional goal of maintaining objectivity leads them
to blankly quote the words of official sources such as the President184. DiMaggio
emphasizes that journalistic objectivity many times “translate[s] into deference to
official sources” particularly because reporters may be starved of other relevant sources
on matters where politicians are involved. DiMaggio finds that Americans do pay
attention to important foreign policy issues and that they typically align behind the
President in light of one-sided media coverage 185. Zaller concurs that journalists simply
report upon the views of elites186. As DiMaggio recounts, “Communication research
emphasizes the official source bias present in the mass media” 187. To wit, the author
finds that journalists are loath to challenge political officials—a finding contrary to
common wisdom which holds that the media is relentlessly critical and apt to report on
“bad news” 188. DiMaggio finds, in analyzing numerous media sources, that “coverage
reiterated administration rhetoric” in the run up to the Iraq War with Fox News adding
attacks on those who opposed war189. One big reason reporters may have failed to
critically analyze presidential statements was that inter-media competition led them to
hurry to “scoop” one another190. DiMaggio finds that a staggering 73.6 percent of New
York Times stories the month following Bush’s September 2002 speech on Iraq
“suggested Iraq did or may have WMDs” 191.
George Edwards hits on a different problem—it’s not that media distorts the
President’s words, it’s that no one cares what the President has to say. Edwards finds
that, “The White House finds it increasingly difficult to obtain an audience for its
views.” Yet Edwards examines old media such as newspapers, major television stations
and Newsweek magazine (which has since ceased print publication) 192. Further, while
Edwards argues that leaders cannot appeal to only one segment of the public, new
media technology, employed gleefully by Donald Trump, counters this supposition 193.
Even though Edwards decries the media’s role in covering presidential speeches, noting
the trend is toward less coverage and more attenuated sound bites, new media may
have turned the tables on this dynamic 194. After all, Donald Trump’s use of Twitter and
Barack Obama’s use of Youtube to speak to the public have allowed these leaders
unfiltered access to the citizenry.
As will be discussed further in chapter four, the social media era has been a boon
for politicians such as Donald Trump, who uses social media to speak directly to his
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followers. This allows Trump to break through the media “noise” and set his own
agenda. That said, Trump’s innovative use of Twitter has since been adopted by other
politicians so that presumably future politicians looking to dictate terms via social
media will be met by a multitude of competing voices. One important aspect to note
about Trump’s use of social media is that his demagogic style has granted him diehard
followers who are willing to swallow his messages whole. Other politicians are less
likely to benefit from such a dynamic, so social media may become just one of many
tools politicians use to convey information to the public. Insofar as social media
provides an “unfiltered” view from politicians, the public will likely view such
pronouncements as biased and partisan or even as marketing or public relations efforts.
Still, it must be taken into account that the public increasingly leans on social media for
their news meaning that the public is choosing primary, but biased sources over
secondary, edited ones. How this will affect the presidency’s ability to shape policy
remains to be seen. Barack Obama’s social media and Youtube pleas fell flat due to a
recalcitrant Congress, while Donald Trump’s cult of personality has been well served
by his extemporaneous and unpolished social media forays.
Finally, it is important to emphasize the critical importance of the media where
terrorism is concerned. After all, “Acts of terrorist violence are communication
phenomena” 195. Terrorists aim to manipulate the media to amplify their violent acts and
concomitantly their political goals. As Brigitte Nacos shows, the public adjusts its
opinions on the terror threat as new information regarding the fight against terror
reaches it 196. In this realm, the media is beholden to the government, which holds much
of the information on terrorists and efforts against them secret.
Contending with George Edwards’ On Deaf Ears
The previous sections reiterated the power of the chief executive to frame the
political agenda and the role of rhetoric in doing so. Yet, there are those who believe
that presidential speeches have little effect. George Edwards’ book On Deaf Ears does a
good job of summarizing these views. This section will be devoted to his work in order
to show where this study deviates from his views.
Edwards holds that presidents usually fail in moving public opinion 197. He
contends that due to divided government (borne of a divided country) and increasingly
ideologically-homogeneous political parties, public opinion in America is very difficult
to move in the President’s favor 198. In other words, Republicans—at home or in
Congress—are not going to be moved by the words of a Democratic President no matter
195
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how eloquent he or she is and vice versa. Even though presidents “go public” more
than ever, Edwards contends that they are not able to persuade or mobilize the public in
most cases 199. That said, Edwards writes that presidents believe that they need public
approval to move Congress200, though this obviously is not the case. Public approval
could pressure Congress, but it isn’t actually necessary to pass legislation. Further, as
seen in the section on congressional partisanship, public opinion can be moved in an
environment that is not politically polarized.
To show the weakness of presidential rhetoric, Edwards examines major
presidential initiatives from 1953 to 1996 and finds that “only” 41 percent became
law 201. Surely, this evidence can be seen in a number of ways. Edwards knocks
presidents for passing less-than half of their initiatives, but to pass two-fifths of their
major initiatives through a laborious congressional process—meant to slow the passage
of legislation—in a country that is frequently divided is not something to cough at.
Indeed, Edwards notes that the executive and legislative branches exhibited “divided
control…nearly two-thirds of the time” over the fifty-year period he examined 202,
further exemplifying the impressiveness of the 41% figure he means to cite as
inadequate.
Edwards makes a strong point when he writes that, “The president transmits his
messages in an environment clogged with competing communications from a wide
variety of sources, through a wide range of media, and on a staggering array of
subjects” to a largely disinterested public 203. To this end, presidents have to frame
issues using “relatively simple themes” 204—a point we will return to in the
methodology section. Yet as John Zaller shows, when elite discourse is divided, as it
nearly always is, the public normally retreats to their partisan predispositions 205. While
the partisan environment, which presidents cannot control, leads chief executives to
seek out public approval for support, legislators do not often listen to the public—
instead, Edwards contends, they stick to their partisan stances206. Only in extreme
moments, like after the September 11, 2001 attacks, do American elites unify their
voices—if temporarily—and a concomitant public show of approval supplies them a
tailwind. In these moments, according to Zaller, “a popular president backed by a
unified Washington community can have a powerful effect on public opinion,
especially that part of the public that is most attentive to politics” 207. Edwards further
emphasizes Kuklinski, et al.’s disenchanting research finding that shows that the more
199

Edwards, On Deaf Ears, pgs. 4, 6.
Edwards, On Deaf Ears, pg. 8.
201
Edwards, On Deaf Ears, pg. 9.
202
Edwards, On Deaf Ears, pg. 12.
203
Edwards, On Deaf Ears, pg. 128.
204
Edwards, On Deaf Ears, pg. 160.
205
Zaller, John R. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1992),
pg. 99.
206
Edwards, On Deaf Ears, pgs. 14, 20.
207
Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, pg. 97.
200

misinformed a person is about politics, the more confident that person will be in their
beliefs 208. Additionally, Edwards shows that the national television and print news
media, the period after 9/11 notwithstanding, has been trending away from covering
the President209. These contentions certainly have their flaws—the growing
Progressive/Democratic Socialist movement in the Democratic Party and the Tea Party
Movement in the Republican Party speak to intraparty ideological heterogeneity.
Further, among the American public, studies continuously show a large group of
Independents—Pew finds that about 4 in 10 Americans define themselves in this
way 210.
Edwards’ views are also time-bound despite his work being published in 2003.
For instance, he writes that, “there is no way for the president to segment his appeals so
that only a select, but sizable, audience hears them”211. Yet, Donald Trump’s rallies and
tweets appear to do just that—speaking to a select group of individuals. Of course,
anyone could read the President’s Twitter feed but, for the most part, those who read it
diligently are supporters and reporters. The rallies are another matter as the President
can take care to admit only supporters to such events—after all, political opponents and
protestors have been kicked out of Trump’s rallies 212.
Edwards provides good fodder for those who view presidential statements as
unimportant. But his argument is lacking in a few respects. First, today’s mass media
environment is different than the one that existed during the time of Edwards’ writing.
Partisans can tune in to FoxNews or MSNBC and reliably receive “red meat” to get
them cursing at their television screens for the rest of the day at the follies of their
political opponents. Second, President Donald Trump certainly reversed the trend of
lesser coverage for presidential messages. In fact, the media has been accused of overcoverage of Trump 213, which may have helped him rise above a crowded Republican
primary field. To some, Trump’s over-the-top rhetoric served a canny purpose: it got
him to the top of the headlines. Trump certainly puts the test to the phrase “any
publicity is good publicity” as media coverage of the President has been much more
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negative than that of past leaders—particularly when compared to the decidedly
positive coverage granted Barack Obama 214.
While Edwards’ contentions are important to note, other scholars have found
taking their cases to the public to be an effective strategy especially in the realm of
national security. For instance, Anthony DiMaggio shows, through careful case studies,
that “presidents benefit from the power to construct narratives” 215. DiMaggio shows
that, time and again in the modern era, presidents pushed the politics of fear and/or the
politics of hope to slowly move the public toward support of their desired national
security initiatives most of which were broadly attached to the Global War on Terror.
These included the campaigns and troop surges in Afghanistan and Iraq and limited
campaigns against Iran and Syria. DiMaggio argues that despite a partisan
environment216, presidential rhetoric—filtered through the mass media—has been
largely successful in moving the public toward supporting the commander-in-chief’s
preferred foreign policies. DiMaggio, in fact, counts eight “rhetorical successes” for
recent presidents including: the 2001 Afghanistan war, the 2003 Iraq War, the 2011
intervention in Libya, and the 2014 war against ISIS in Syria and Iraq 217.
While Edwards holds that presidents are rarely able to move public opinion,
implying that presidential rhetoric has little use, many other studies counter this
finding. David Zarefsky contends that Edwards views the effect of rhetoric too
narrowly, looking for immediate public opinion effects rather than acknowledging that
“attitudes are seldom changed on the basis of a single message” 218. It takes time and
repetition for messages to shift opinion as DiMaggio confirms 219. Further presidential
rhetoric could serve to reinforce opinions 220. It could also, as will be seen in this study,
“create associations with other terms” 221. Presidents, thus, are able to define events
through their rhetoric 222. Consequently, “Public opinion polls and other empirical
surveys of audience response are not likely to measure the effectiveness of presidential
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definitions, because the definition affects the whole frame of reference within which the question
is discussed. Caught up in the shifting frame, people are likely to see it as natural reality
rather than the product of rhetorical choice” 223.
Moreover, Jeffrey Cohen’s case studies of presidential response to public opinion
show that the relationship is mixed. Sometimes presidents do respond to public
opinion—or to their anticipation of that opinion’s effects. Other times, presidents resist
or oppose public opinion. Still other times, presidents compromise with the findings of
opinion polls, adjusting their approaches accordingly. A determining factor in this
relationship is the level of commitment a president has to the given policy area. If a
president is committed to a certain policy, he or she will likely resist countervailing
opinion. However, if he or she has lost control of the policy agenda, the President then
may be more likely to cede to public pressure 224. If the President’s words sometimes fall
on deaf ears, as Edwards argues, the public’s opinions sometimes fall on deaf ears too,
as Cohen shows. This is because the public expects the President “to lead and to
follow” 225.
DiMaggio challenges works that find the President to be a weak actor in foreign
policy. To the contrary, DiMaggio’s research shows that presidents are able to gain a
great deal of public support for their international agendas by “going public” 226.
DiMaggio is able to show that presidential rhetoric on foreign policy has an effect on
the public by providing for a lag between presidential words and public reaction. He
notes that there is not an immediate change in public opinion after a president speaks,
but that, instead, presidential rhetoric is filtered through the media and affects the
public over a longer period of time227.
Cohen goes further, holding that leaders will feign agreement with the public while
acting as they see fit. The author finds that the President typically reiterates public
concerns—a form of symbolic responsiveness—while forgoing more substantive forms
of responding to the public 228. Cohen holds that, “Presidents will be symbolically
responsive to the public when doing so does not constrain substantive choices about
policies; however, responsiveness to the public declines as decisions become more
substantive” 229.
Going Public: How Rhetoric Succeeds and Fails
The Constitution does not prescribe that presidents employ public rhetoric to get
things done. In fact, as was seen in the discussion on the rhetorical presidency, the
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opposite is more true. So what has changed? Why do presidents “go public” to try to
achieve their goals? What is effective or ineffective about such a strategy?
In a study examining about 200 years of presidential statements, Elvin Lim
discovered five trends in presidential speech-making. First, presidential rhetoric has
become more anti-intellectual, meaning it is more colloquial and less formal. Second, it
has become more abstract: it relies on more “religious, poetic and idealistic references.”
Third, it is more assertive. This means that presidential speech today is more aggressive
and speaks more readily of “the language of power” dictated by the Realist school of
International Relations. Fourth, it is more democratic, meaning “people-oriented” and
“inclusive,” today than it was in the past. Finally, it is conversational and attempts to
build a bond built on trust between the speaker and the audience230. Lim concludes by
defending these trends against those who might wax nostalgic for more formal times.
He notes that Hitler was fond of “biological facts” that supported his racist views and
that Presidents need to speak to the societies from which they come in language those
societies understand 231. George Washington would likely sound stilted as a 21st century
orator and Donald Trump would surely sound brash (to choose a generous term) to 18th
century patricians.
The Constitutions’ Framers sought to create a system that was insulated from
public opinion. They did this through staggered elections which forced the public to
keep their passions at bay between elections. The idea was to forge a government based
upon, in theory, the exchange of pluralistic ideas and, in practice, a rich society of
bargaining insulated from popular opinion 232.
Instead, what we see today is a presidency whose power sits in its centrality and its
ability to pressure through rhetoric. The Office of the President comes with many
powers none, according to Neustadt, as venerable as the power to persuade. As Richard
Neustadt writes, “Presidential ‘powers’ may be inconclusive when a president
commands, but always remain relevant as he persuades. The status and authority
inherent in his office reinforce his logic and his charm” 233. The President of the United
States, despite all of the checks-and-balances constitutionally installed in the American
system, stands as the central figure in American politics. As a unitary actor, the
President combines his or her personality with an office that sits atop the hierarchy of
American democracy. The President can nominate Supreme Court justices, sign
executive orders and veto legislation—in addition to his or her role as the commanderin-chief of the most powerful military in human history. The veto-threat has become an
oft-used form of presidential rhetoric as it is a powerful signal presidents wield which
“may affect the president’s success in Congress” 234.
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With all of these tools at a president’s disposal, what might be the point of rhetoric?
After all, President Obama conducted a rather fulsome assassination campaign across
multiple countries, as chapter 3 examines, without having to “go public.” With
terrorism in particular, covert operations may justify a quiescent approach. Yet,
presidents are called upon to talk about terrorism (among other subjects) and
sometimes even choose to speak about the topic.
To begin then, it is important to note why Presidents “go public.” Sam Kernell
coined the term “going public” in his seminal eponymous book 235. Going public entails
the enlistment of public opinion in a president’s quest to pass policies or legislation by
directly speaking to the citizenry236. What began as speeches now manifests itself in
tweets, which not only circumvent Congress but also circumvent the mass media. In
matters of national security especially, the President may not need public approval for
his or her actions. The aforementioned drone campaign conducted by Barack Obama is
proof of that fact.
If a president may act in many instances without public support and if the public
is fickle and divided, then why seek to move the public at all? Two key reasons are to
set the agenda and to sell policies. The President is one of the most important people in the
world. Statements by the President, via social media or mass media sound bites, do
reach the broader public. These statements serve to set the political agenda domestically
and globally. As Kingdon notes, the President is a key figure among many who set the
political agenda and he or she has strong institutional resources to do so, including
control of the executive branch, the veto and the unitary leadership of the executive
branch 237. The President has, in Bourdieu’s term 238, “the delegated power of the
spokesperson” 239. This power amounts to the power to set the agenda and frame events
on one’s own terms. Through speech-making, the President moves his or her policies
forward against alternatives.
Smith and Smith view all politics as communication 240. To this end, presidents
define the structure of politics through the rhetorical choices they make 241. The authors
note that communication has many roles in government. Communication expresses
concepts to the public regarding how society should be structured and thus legitimizes
power distributions. Examples of this are Bush’s discussions of good versus evil in the
world or speeches referring to “the doctrines of Divine Right, Social Darwinism, and
Consent of the Governed.” Communication also orients society by “defining objectives
and problems in coherent narratives.” These narratives compete with one another, but
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normally one rises to ascendancy and is accepted as it “frames an agenda for ordering
society’s priorities” 242. Communication resolves conflicts “by drawing new distinctions,
by transcending differences, by verifying factual claims, by weighing arguments, by
adjudicating arguments, and by choosing between prospective futures.” Finally,
communication “serves to implement policies by mobilizing or by narcotizing
others” 243. Presidents make choices with their words and many of those choices are
meant to persuade either the public or politicians 244.
Kernell does his share of hand-wringing regarding the current state of affairs, noting
that presidents are meant to bargain with Congress and the “rhetorical presidency” (to
use Tulis’ oft-used phrase) has frayed the intended role of the commander-in-chief 245.
To Kernell, going public destroys the fabric of the bargaining society the Constitution
intended to create. Such a society is deliberative, careful and weighs policy matters on
their merits rather than caving to outside pressures246. Going public goes against the
President’s role in bargaining. It is non-deliberative, it does not include benefits for
compliance “but freely imposes costs for noncompliance”, it “entails public posturing,”
and it “undermines the legitimacy of other politicians” 247. Kernell writes that, “Going
public has become routine”248, but it wasn’t always this way.
Today, “regardless of the political climate in Washington,” presidents go public 249.
The worry of presidential scholars is that chief executives will grab ever more power,
leading the country into democratic backsliding 250. These worries are not without merit
as will be seen in the case studies. In Freedom and Order, I show how crises have
consistently been used by democratic chief executives to expand their power.
Here again, Kernell provides useful insights. He notes that presidents go public as a
way of pressuring other politicians into submitting to the President’s demands on
policy. Such a strategy works best when public opinion is in the President’s favor 251.
Eshbaugh-Soha argues that presidential rhetoric is employed to move legislators not the
public. He writes that, “the president uses his speeches…to put public pressure on
legislators to succumb to the president’s wishes” 252. Eshbaugh-Soha argues that public
opinion matters little in the policy-making process. Instead, Eshbaugh-Soha contends
that the import of presidential rhetoric lies in the signals it confers to influence
legislators 253. Kernell also notes that as presidents have increasingly filled the role of
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political outsiders, they have lost the art of bargaining with legislators as they lack the
appropriate training and experience254.
Like Kernell, Edwards argues that the real effect of presidential rhetoric may be on
elite discourse and debate 255. Edwards, going even further than Tulis, decries the
“antideliberative propensities of the permanent campaign” and calls for a return to a
presidency based upon quiet bargaining 256. The permanent campaign is a symptom of
the unending pursuit of public approval 257. This leads Kernell to equate the going
public strategy of governing with campaigning 258. And, indeed, the endless campaign
has been mentioned repeatedly by media and scholars alike 259.
“Bargaining presidents require the sage advice of politicians familiar with the
bargaining game,” Kernell writes, “presidents who go public need pollsters.” To this
end, public opinion has become a critical concern of modern presidents. As Kernell
notes, “presidents from Carter through Bush have all had in-house pollsters taking
continuous—weekly, even daily—readings of public opinion.” While George H.W.
Bush spent $216,000 of RNC money on in-house polling, which seemed extravagant at
the time, Bill Clinton spent ten times that amount in 1993 260. Further, trends toward
stronger partisanship make going public more a “preaching to the choir” strategy than
it was in the past 261. The strategy also has become less effective due to the crowding of
the media marketplace 262.
Thus we see President Donald Trump, a complete political novice occupying the
most important political office in the land, turning to social media tweets to
communicate with the public and engaging in publicly televised conversations with
legislators rather than doing the hard, behind-the-scenes work of bargaining. President
Trump goes public not only because he means to pressure his political opponents but
also because it is all he knows. Like President Reagan before him, Trump’s career as an
entertainer informs his political strategies. To President Trump, going public is what
one does to market one’s self and one’s policies. Further, for a president whose
campaign truly never ends, going public is a method for detracting his political
opponents and for denouncing policies with which he disagrees.
Being the President is not necessarily becoming an easier job, even if more powers
are being accrued by the Office. Increasingly, the public expects the President to be
everything to everyone. Jeffrey Cohen laments that, “Modern presidents face not only
high but contradictory expectations. The contradiction between providing active policy
leadership for the mass public while also being responsive to its policy preferences
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strikes at the core of the modern presidency” 263. As Cohen states, the President must be
“responsive to the public,” but “is also expected to lead.” While public responsiveness
lends short-term support, leadership is still necessary to “control the policy-making
process.” How do presidents square this circle? By symbolically responding to public
demands. Cohen shows that the public “holds the president responsible for the
policies” he or she implements and gives credit, in the form of support, when those
policies prove effective264. George Edwards in The Public Presidency writes that, “We
expect the president to be a leader, an independent figure who speaks out and takes
stands on the issues even if his views are unpopular…In sharp contrast to our
expectations for presidential leadership is our expectation that the chief executive be
responsive to public opinion and that he be constrained by majority rule as represented
by Congress” 265. The President’s resources and authority are insufficient to fulfill the
expectations placed on him or her, so, as Neustadt argues, the commander-in-chief is
forced to persuade others in order to achieve his or her policy goals 266.
Since presidents symbolically respond to the people without actually changing the
substance of their policies, Cohen believes that the executive “may be the least policy
responsive” branch of the American government 267. Cohen concludes by lamenting the
pressures on presidents to cave to public demands “in this media-saturated age” 268.
Still, like any leader, presidents have found ways to get their constituents “off their
backs” by symbolically feigning agreement while acting as they see fit.
Terrorism and Going Public
Many studies look at how terrorism changes public opinion 269, this study instead
examines how presidents drive terrorism policy through their rhetoric. To this end, the
focus will be on what leaders say and not what surveys say about mass opinion. Carol
Winkler shares this approach. She focuses on presidential discourse on terrorism
because the public “turns to the president during times of national crisis.” Because the
president is commander-in-chief and plays a vital role on the world stage, his or her
words are highly significant when discussing terrorism 270. Anthony DiMaggio, further,
finds that “presidents are more successful in socially constructing public support for
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U.S. foreign policy than many scholars previously recognized” 271. As DiMaggio
summarizes, “presidential rhetoric remains central to the successful selling of U.S.
foreign policy” 272. Mass fear of terrorism led the public to support the president in
conducting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and in approving the troop surge in
Afghanistan in 2009 273, but this fear was sown by presidential constructions of the
terrorist threat 274—as can be patently seen in the selling of the 2003 Iraq War.
Academics and media alike studying or reporting on terrorism turn to the
government for news as access to information on terrorist plots or to individual
terrorists is difficult or impossible obtain 275. Still it is important to note that the
terrorism label has been used by presidents to describe “antiwar protests, computer
hacking, domestic violence, protests against US governmental policies, and political
disagreements between presidential candidates” 276. Presidents also twist the
motivations of terrorists, frequently making them out to seek world domination or the
end of democracy277. In sum, access to information about terrorism is highly restricted
by the government, forcing the public to rely on government statements and
suppositions 278. For this reason, evaluating presidential rhetoric and how presidents
construct terror threats is critical.
Wesley Windmaier argues that, “[P]residential constructions of foreign policy
crises have legitimated recurring transformations of U.S. national interests.” For
instance, “Presidents Harry Truman and George W. Bush constructed crises that
justified liberal crusades in the Cold War and the War on Terror.” Eisenhower
counseled for the “need to maintain balance.” Eisenhower warned against “a recurring
temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous
solution” 279. In what Windmaier calls the “fast thinking” phase, “crusading views cast
liberal ideals as values to be exported, to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of others” 280.
For example, Truman framed the Cold War as a fight over basic values, justifying an
aggressive stance against the U.S.S.R. 281. Truman coupled this existential framework
with an alarmism that equated minor losses with large, global consequences282.
Windmaier states that “the Truman administration found itself caught in a rhetorical
trap of its own making” 283, precisely because it had based its analysis “on Soviet
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capabilities, rather than intentions” 284. Still, it was Eisenhower who coined the term
“domino theory,” which set the foundation and modus operandi for the Cold War 285.
Eisenhower’s “realist restraint” pulled back some of Truman’s liberal crusading forcing
a recalibration of U.S. foreign policy 286. This cycle of overreaction and recalibration is
evident in the examination of Bush, Obama and Trump speeches made in this book—
though here it will be shown that the wax and wane of rhetoric is more superficial once
policies are taken into account.
Credibility Gaps: Where Rhetoric Fails
A final note on rhetoric. Credibility is critically important to the effectiveness of
presidential rhetoric. Credibility gaps erode the effectiveness of presidential rhetoric.
Smith and Smith hold that presidents’ claims to legitimacy are three fold. Leaders must
be trustworthy, competent and their words must align with reality as the public sees
it 287. Neustadt emphasizes that presidents need to be credible and trusted in order for
people to (potentially) follow their lead. He writes that, “A gap in credibility so large as
to cast doubt upon the king’s legitimacy threatens the throne precisely because
commoners and court perceive it and react in the same terms” 288. Since presidents
increasingly rely on “crisis politics” to generate interest, they subject themselves to a
potential wearing away of their credibility as citizens begin to question the legitimacy of
rhetorically-constructed crises289.
Presidents lose their legitimacy when the public begins worrying about their
fitness for office leading to a loss in the public’s trust in the leader. This many times
leads to inconsistent rhetoric and logical inconsistencies which send the President into a
downward spiral—a strategy predicated on desperation 290. Windmaier notes that
credibility gaps transition presidential policies from crusades to more cool-headed
policy orientations as policy inflexibility and popular-will force leaders to move away
from realist overcorrections and back to liberal overreactions291.
An important example of a credibility gap forming comes from the case of Bill
Clinton who established a leadership style wherein he set the agenda by dictating the
direction and priorities of the government through major speeches. He then had the
executive branch prepare the details of his policies. Congress then revised, refined or
completely replaced those policies 292. Clinton, however, tried to get out of the Monica
Lewinsky scandal using rhetoric; his denial reduced his credibility with the public 293.
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As previously mentioned, John Mueller finds that presidential rhetoric, where no
great credibility gap exists, can effectively set the foreign policy agenda. President
George HW Bush saw a great rise in approval for his job as President due to the Gulf
War 294. Mueller, like DiMaggio, found that the media—due to public demand—was
uncritical of the Gulf War effort, even at times ignoring the presence of antiwar
protests295. Yet, the first Bush lost public approval just like his son would—famously
dropping the 1992 election to Bill Clinton. One reason for this was that he allowed
Saddam Hussein to stay in power in Iraq after framing him as a dangerous villain 296.
This created a credibility gap for George HW Bush. Relatedly, President Reagan’s
charisma and oratory were effective, but their effectiveness did not survive the
credibility gap created by Iran-Contra 297. Clinton’s credibility gap due to personal
conduct and lying about said conduct can be added to these examples.
In sum, credibility gaps erode presidents’ abilities to sell policies. Due to
credibility gaps, the George W. Bush administration had great difficulty selling the
occupation of Iraq while the Obama administration was unable to garner support for
action against Syria from a war-weary public 298. Credibility gaps will be explored
further in the empirical chapters.
Methodology
The original data for this book comes from a content analysis-derived database
collected by the author and his research assistants. The database contains information
from presidential speeches on terrorism from September 2001 to February 2019. Rather
than employing a quantitative, “word count” approach, the determination was made to
explore “themes” hit on by Presidents Bush, Obama and Trump since 9/11. The reason
for this was that searching for themes, though more time-consuming, would retain
context and allow for a more substantive, robust comparison.
The unit of analysis in this database is the presidential speech. This is because the
notion is to capture what themes each president seeks to convey to the public. Whether
a speech conveys a specific theme once or three hundred times, the study codes the
theme as present. This is to insure that repetition within a single speech does not skew
the findings. The idea here is to search for trends in presidential speech-making. One
speech where a theme or statement is oft-repeated could have undo effect on the data if
themes or words were tallied from each speech. Individual statements will be examined
to add qualitative evidence to the database findings.
Not every utterance made by each president over this time period is examined.
In order to determine what speeches to examine, the research team collected speeches
where some derivation of the word “terror” was used three times. This allowed for the
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rhetor to define terrorism for himself. This also cut out speeches where terrorism was
discussed tangentially or not at all. The source for the speeches was the whitehouse.gov
web site. Where months-long gaps in speeches were found, the research team searched
alternative sources for transcribed presidential speeches and included the relevant
terrorism-related speeches in the study. This means that the speeches that are included
are mostly formal ones. Most of the analysis comes from formal speeches or remarks,
but some interviews are included as these were either published on whitehouse.gov or
discovered by the research team as we searched for gaps in our database. An effort was
made to be exhaustive and, to this end, we added Twitter to our examination when it
was made plain that President Trump preferred this mode of communication.
Suffice it to say, not every statement on terrorism by each president is
guaranteed to be included here for a number of reasons. First, we do not include
statements by the presidents from when they were candidates or presidents-elect in the
database, though some of these statements are qualitatively examined in this book.
Second, not every interview or utterance or document created by the President is
included here. Finally, there could have been statements that were missed given our
method of searching for three utterances of “terror.” To correct for this, we added the
term “extremist” into our searches to try to scrape more speeches. That said, there are
some speeches that will be examined anecdotally that are not part of the database given
its guidelines, but that we deemed important.
What the database contains, then, is the only systematic examination of
presidential rhetorical themes on terrorism that exists to my knowledge. Other studies
have examined presidential rhetoric on terrorism by looking at speeches, at case studies
or by quantitatively counting words or concepts, but none draw from a database that
systematically collects a content analysis examining thematic elements of these
speeches.
A “theme” is an idea or concept that is touched upon in a given speech. To this
end, saying “terrorism is nothing to fear” implies a different thematic element than
saying “terrorism is the great enemy of our time.” A word count analysis would count
the word “terrorism” or “enemy” but would not know the context. Even “enemy”
might not be of great use for counting since it can be used in the negative sense: “the
Palestinians are our friends, not our enemies.” Since context is important in any
statement, the research team decided that we would search for themes rather than
exploring the topic through word count or a different quantitative method. That said,
the themes are counted so the qualitative analysis yields quantitative data.
The content analysis entailed reading each speech to identify themes that
indicate either alarm about terrorism or attempts to calm fears299. We scored the themes
in binary fashion, noting “Yes” if a theme was present or “No” if it was absent. For
some themes, qualitative data was noted such as what conflict or issue a president linked
terrorism to or what terms a president used to refer to terrorists. The research team
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identified speeches that related to terrorism and then went through a checklist of
themes to see which were present in the relevant speeches.
The themes were selected with an eye toward examining how presidents
calibrate—inflate or ratchet down—the terrorist threat. To this end, the themes all speak
to how the threat and America’s terrorist adversaries are defined. Most of the themes
involve inflating the terror threat, though their absence could show that the President is
toning down the threat. Deflationary themes, such as tolerance toward Muslims, are
also examined.
The first five types of themes we looked for are descriptions of the campaign
against terrorism (or “war on terror”). The first theme regarded the duration of the
conflict. We coded a “Yes” if the rhetor emphasized the long duration of the war on
terror and “No” if the speaker did not do so. The second theme looked to see whether
the speaker emphasized the necessity of the war on terror. The third thematic element
explored whether the speaker said that the effort to fight terrorism post-9/11 was
unlike other wars due to its interminability or the nature of the enemy or some other
factor. The fourth theme looked for what conflicts or other issues the speaker linked the
fight against terrorism to—here the specific linkages were also noted. Finally, the last
theme that described the terrorism campaign looked for whether the speaker mentioned
jihad or violent jihad against America.
The next four themes concern the nature of America’s terrorist adversaries. We
looked for speeches that included the following elements: first, describing a worldwide
conspiracy or worldwide operatives; second, describing terrorist adversaries as
“persistent,” “resilient,” “determined” or some other related adjective; third, talking
about plots involving weapons of mass destruction; and fourth stating that terrorists
pose an existential threat to America or comparing terrorists to Nazis or the Soviet
Union. Together, these themes capture the perceived goals and capabilities of America’s
terrorist opponents in the eyes of the nation’s leader.
We also looked for attempts to play down the terror threat. We asked whether
the President stated that the threat had diminished and whether he or she
recommended tolerance toward Muslims. With the tolerance toward Muslims question,
we asked whether the president distinguished between American Muslims and
America’s jihadist enemies.
Finally, we made a list of the terms each president used to describe terrorists
and counted the use of prominent terms. Here the research team sought to analyze
whether speeches described terrorists in grandiose or mundane terms. Terms like
“terrorists” or “al-Qaeda” are more precise and potentially less alarming than terms like
“evil-doers.”
In total, this study analyzed 82 speeches made by President Donald Trump
(through February 2019), 135 speeches made by President Barack Obama and 446
speeches made by President George W. Bush (all from September 11, 2001 and later). In
total, this study analyzed 663 presidential speeches—the most definitive such study that
presently exists. The database will be used in this book not only to analyze presidential
rhetoric but also for purposes of comparison. Chart 1.1 depicts the frequency of formal

presidential speeches about terrorism post-9/11. Note that after a period of extremely
heavy focus on the issue (George W. Bush had 85 terrorism-focused speeches after 9/11
in 2001 and 169 in 2002), the frequency of speeches settled down to about thirty per year
with a low of 9 in 2012 under Obama. Bush’s third highest year for frequency of
speeches was 2006 with 46 terrorism-related speeches. Note the higher incidence of
speeches under Donald Trump (in 2017 and 2018) as compared to the ten years prior.
[Insert Chart 1.1 Here]
The purpose of this study is to compare presidential responses to terrorism after
9/11. To this end, speeches of presidents serving before the attacks are not included. To
be sure, historical context and evidence regarding how previous presidents—such as
Ronald Reagan—viewed terrorism are included in the discussions. Expanding the
database beyond 9/11 would certainly provide for more data, but it also would shift the
focus. Here the focus is: how did the three post-9/11 presidents calibrate the terror
threat after a dramatic attack that caused drastic change? Focusing on the Gulf War or
Ronald Reagan’s dealings with Muammar Qaddafi, both of which are mentioned
repeatedly in this book, would move the topic from how the terror threat is framed in a
post-9/11 world to one of how presidents speak about terrorism generally. Adding pre9/11 speeches to the database is surely an area for future research that could lead to
new findings. Of course, the most obvious inclusion would be Bill Clinton (since he
came before George W. Bush) who parried away from discussing terrorism until the
end of his term300. Such an inclusion might imply that the ”baseline” for discussing
terrorism is low, when a more expansive study of pre-9/11 presidential rhetoric would
have to be done to get at the true “baseline” figure.
There is strong evidence that terrorism has been a concern of presidents well
before 9/11. Bill Clinton made two speeches justifying air strikes against Sudan and
Afghanistan on the grounds that the sites that were bombed supported terrorism. In
those speeches, he mentioned Osama bin-Laden by name and stated that “terrorism is
one of the greatest dangers we face in this new global era.” Clinton described terrorists
as having distorted their religion and stated that their mission was “murder.” Presaging
9/11 and the rhetoric that would follow, Clinton declared:
“My fellow Americans, our battle against terrorism did not begin with the
bombing of our embassies in Africa, nor will it end with today’s strike. It will
require strength, courage, and endurance. We will not yield to this threat. We
will meet it no matter how long it may take. This will be a long, ongoing struggle
between freedom and fanaticism, between the rule of law and terrorism. We
must be prepared to do all that we can for as long as we must. America is and
will remain a target of terrorists precisely because we are leaders; because we act
to advance peace, democracy, and basic human values; because we’re the most
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open society on earth; and because, as we have shown yet again, we take an
uncompromising stand against terrorism” 301.
A Note on Definition
By now it is old hat that the definition of terrorism is a contentious one 302. Much
has been made of the linking of violence committed by Muslims or Arabs to the term
“terrorism,” and that avenue will be explored throughout the book in analyzing each
president’s rhetoric. For purposes of this study, a literary analysis of terrorism
definitions is unnecessary because how terrorism is defined by the post-9/11 Presidents
will be the focus. The pitfalls of these definitions will be examined as well. How
presidents discuss terrorism will help us see how they define the term. After 9/11, a
global war on terror has been conducted pitting the American armed forces and
intelligence agencies against largely Muslim opponents. This campaign certainly colors
many of the statements on terrorism made by the presidents, but given the 17.5-year
length of the study there is ample room for divergence. Ramifications of narrowly
defining terrorism as a phenomenon endemic to Islam or to certain Arab or Muslim
extremists will be discussed in the empirical chapters and the conclusion.
Plan of the Book
The following summarizes where the next few chapters will take us. Chapters 2,
3 and 4 are empirical chapters examining the rhetoric of Presidents George W. Bush,
Barack Obama and Donald Trump respectively. These chapters will include some
comparison between cases. The final chapter offers conclusions on the topic.
Chapter Two: George W. Bush, Policy Selling and the Post-9/11 Years
In this chapter the way President George W. Bush discussed the terror threat in
the years after 9/11 will be discussed. President Bush’s role is critical in this study
because he established the main thematic elements regarding the terrorist threat that
others would agree with or oppose. President Obama’s approach, then, can be seen as
an (attempted) antithesis of Bush’s. While Trump’s approach can be seen as a return to
Bush’s thesis.
Further, George W. Bush’s speeches were important in that they served to sell
policies he linked to the counterterror effort such as civil liberty-abridging legislation
and wars abroad. Bush was put in an unenviable position after the attacks in 2001,
when by far the most deadly terror attacks to date (and, thankfully, since) took place.
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Even though the threat was real, Bush’s speeches—as the data will show—inflated the
threat and exacerbated the problem. The chapter will show how Bush pushed an
inflated view of the terror threat to forward an expansive war on terror in America and
abroad. By linking the threat to rogue regimes, Bush also got the public behind his plans
to invade Iraq. The Bush administration’s rhetoric so muddied the waters that a
majority of the American public came to believe that Osama bin-Laden and Saddam
Hussein were linked 303.
Chapter Three: Barack Obama: From an End to Terror to Drone Wars and ISIS
Barack Obama ran in 2008 on an anti-Bush and anti-Iraq War platform. In the
first 100 days of his first term, Obama famously issued an executive order to close the
detention center housing terrorist suspects in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The mainstream
news proclaimed the President “No Drama Obama” and he was feted with a Nobel
Peace Prize in addition to being lauded for a more tolerant approach to Muslims
highlighted by his June 4, 2009 Cairo speech. Cass Sunstein, who wrote Laws of Fear:
Beyond the Precautionary Principle to counter the Bush administration’s approach to the
terror threat304, was, after all, Obama’s top regulatory official.
The study’s data shows that Obama downplayed the terror threat. He made
significantly fewer speeches about terrorism than did Bush. Further, the content of his
speeches was more frank and specific. While he did not do as much to inflate the threat,
Obama never did close Guantanamo and he carried out a large targeted killing
campaign in numerous Muslim countries 305. This speaks to the fact that Obama did not
have to sell policy as Bush had already done the policy selling for him. Obama did
relish in the killing of Osama bin-Laden.
A further factor in the Obama administration came with the rise of ISIS/the
Islamic State who Obama famously called “the JV team.” Obama’s approach to the
terror threat was so rigid in its anti-Bush stance that his administration found itself flatfooted as a new, more tech-savvy version of al Qaeda rose to prominence. This chapter
will show the promise and pitfall in Obama’s approach. President Obama’s attempt to
downplay the threat eventually would be replaced by a re-visitation of Bush-era
policies.
Chapter Four: Donald Trump, Twitter, and Islamophobia: The End of Dignity in Presidential
Rhetoric about Terrorism
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The rise of Donald Trump, with his famed use of Twitter as a platform for
connecting with the public, has seemingly turned presidential rhetoric on its head.
Trump is less polished and more direct in his speeches. His Islamophobic rhetoric goes
beyond anything stated by Obama or Bush, and he ties anti-immigration rhetoric to the
terror threat. The effects of Trump’s Islamophobia and xenophobia and his concomitant
blindspot for white nationalist terrorism will be the main subject of chapter four, which
will examine Trump’s speeches and Twitter use in his first two years in office.
Chapter Five: How Do We Properly Calibrate the Terror Threat?
The final chapter will wrap up the issues discussed in the book. First, the roles of
presidential rhetoric in agenda-setting and policy selling will be reconsidered. Second,
the proper calibration of the terror threat will be discussed as Bush overshot the issue
and Obama undershot it (at least in the case of ISIS/the Islamic State). Third, policy
proposals for how the public and presidents should view and calibrate the terror threat
will be explored.
The chapter will make the following conclusions. First, it will reinforce the link
between frequency of speeches on an issue and policy selling. Second, it will emphasize
the importance of rhetoric in pushing a president’s favored policies, with border
security and the Iraq War being seminal examples. Third, it will show that, contrary to
the talk of a change since Obama, the terror threat has been viewed similarly by all
three post-9/11 presidents and that Obama and Trump have borrowed from the agenda
and narrative set by George W. Bush. Lastly, the book will end with policy proposals
including more narrowly defining terrorism and a call for more tolerance especially
toward domestic minority groups in presidential speeches.

